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ABSTRACT This article investigates how representation attaches meaning to bodies, how certain
bodies are categorically misrepresented and masked from normativity, and proposes a curriculum
theory affording the agency of the misrepresented to de-mask invisibility. Brief historical narratives of
three kinds of invisibility are presented as they are manifested in educational practice and visual culture
– masking those deemed to occupy lesser physical bodies, lesser bodies of knowledge, and bodies
lesser-than-normal. The author argues the relevance of art education as a transformative pedagogical
practice that can inform and promote social significance, or what the author terms as in/di/visuality,
the agency to reinterpret misrepresented physical or conceptual bodies. In the face of masking practices
that unleash the squalls of invisibility and inequity throughout sites of curriculum practice and
contemporary visual culture, the exercise of in/di/visuality acts as a watershed, displacing invisibility
and affording a greater breadth of inclusion in educational concerns.

Masking Practices and In/di/visuality
Latin American scholar and cultural critic Gerard Aching (2002) speaks of the existence of ‘rigidly
bordered visual regimes’ organizing social hierarchies into relations of power and contestation,
social visibility, and social invisibility:
These issues concerning ways of (not) seeing and strategies of (in)visibility have in turn led me to
explore the historical development and cultural contexts of particular visual regimes (structured
ways of seeing) and visual politics (the enforcement or rejection of specific visual regimes) in the
texts that I examine ... For if it is at all possible to claim that rigidly bordered visual regimes exist,
then these frontiers easily disintegrate when we ask very basic questions about viewing subjects,
such as, who sees, who fails to see, and who refuses to see? (p. 5)

Aching (2002) employs the terms ‘masking’ and ‘masking practices’ ‘to invoke a broader and deeper
understanding of the antagonisms that produce situations of social (in)visibility’ (p. 4). The
rendering of social invisibility is an act of power, a masking practice intended to preserve an
advantageous power relationship. Such maskings are discursively wrought, demonstrated in
written, spoken, or otherwise communicable language vehicles; in a visual regime or visual culture
as is prevalent in the West, maskings are effectively manifested in visuality (Pieterse, 1990).
Misrepresented bodies are bodies made socially invisible. However, when the misrepresented
and invisible don a mask of their own (re)making, it is also an act of power, a flouting of the power
to conceal with the power to dispossess concealment. When a prescribed invisibility is co-opted as
a cloak for translated self-concept, invisibility is transformed into a redemptive inscrutability, a
cocoon from which new questions emerge to subvert misrecognition and devaluation.
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Three Kinds of Invisibility
This article investigates ‘how representation attaches meanings to bodies’ (Thomson, 1997, p. 5),
and how certain bodies, once categorically misrepresented, are bodies made socially invisible. A
body is a corpus of ideas that have been given a shape, a representation amongst the world of
things. There are probably more than three kinds of social invisibility prevalent in contemporary
educational practice, but I will focus on only three in the space of this article – the invisibility of
those deemed to occupy lesser physical bodies, lesser bodies of knowledge, and bodies lesser-thannormal.
This article also explores the de-masking of mantles of invisibility, and the supplanting of
masks of concealment with masks of agency that ‘literally or figuratively’ removes ‘an ideological
mask from oneself or someone else in encounters or confrontations between masked subjects and
viewing subjects’ (Aching, 2002, p. 6).
My aim is to theorize art education and visual culture studies at the intersection of curriculum
theory in ways that
challenge existing social relations ... resist interpretations of certain bodily configurations and
functioning as deviant ... question the ways that differences are invested with meaning ...
examine the enforcement of universalizing norms ... interrogate the politics of appearance ...
explore the politics in naming ... [and] forge positive identities. (Thomson, 1997, p. 22)

The types of invisibility I speak of are all initially discursive essentialisms, wrought through the
symbolic interaction of dominant visual regimes within what has come to be a global visual
culture. Although discursive forms of invisibility are not manifested physically at the outset,
inevitably any kind of invisibility played out in social arenas works to swallow bodies whole.
Drawing upon William F. Pinar’s (2004) reconceptualization of curriculum as ‘ongoing, if
complicated conversation’ (p. 188) and a framework for methodologies ‘of subjective risk and social
reconstruction, the achievement of selfhood and society in the age to come’ (p. 4), currere is defined
as the verb form of curriculum. Currere is an autobiographical method that invites episodes of
narrative reflection and de-masking in education, a method that ‘asks us to slow down to
remember even re-enter the past, and to meditatively imagine the future’ (Pinar, 2004, p. 4). Currere
is thus a precedent for elaborating a practice that transforms prescribed masks of identity from
places of capture to sites of gestation.
Autobiographically speaking, I have been marked invisible in each of the three ways
elaborated in this article. Whether representing a living human and relational body or a living body
of knowledge, the anamorphology of that body’s signifiers is often a distortion, the aggregate of
symbols constituting a particular social significance from a given point of view at a given point in
time. Thus, yesterday’s representations lend themselves perhaps too readily to essentializations;
this is how yesterday’s representations are reified as today’s misrepresentations. The marking of
invisibility in educational practice layers flesh and blood bodies in broad and swaddling discursive
sheaths, bending light away from the agency of anyone so marked to alter his or her occluding
signifiers. A misrepresented body is thus masked, even within the contours of familiar knowledge
or visible flesh, bone and hair. The marking of living bodies constitutes the social construction of
invisibility.
Invisibility as Agency
The de-masking of bodies is also a form of social construction premised on the specters of
possibility, ‘the use of the mask, literally and metaphorically, in coming to terms or coping with an
environment that has yet to work in their interest’ (Aching, 2002, p. 59). The de-masking of bodies
transforms places of capture into sites of gestation and possibility.
As an art educator, my chosen profession addresses the social construction of invisibility as
effected through masking practices inherent in public schooling. Arts education practice carries in it
the potential to de-mask and disrupt the essentializing cloaks that render the living invisible. I am
proposing the practice of in/di/visuality as a method that works ‘in between’ masks, creating
discursive places ‘for resisting the politics of essentialism’ (Brunner, 1998, p. 7).
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The significance of in/di/visuality as a hybridization of art education practice and curriculum
theory is not merely as a language game highlighting the agency within acts of individuality, but in
the dialectical places it illuminates ‘in between’ individuality and the visuality of social individuals,
places ‘in which “the subject-as-[pedagogical] site” ... actively seeks to “undo the [essentialized]
proper”’ (Brunner, 1998, p. 7).
These in-between places or sites are ‘altering aspects’ of precedent meaning (Brunner, 1998,
p. 7); ‘shadows dancing an unquiet self’ in between known masks (Brunner, p. 1); places of slippage
between the signifier and the signified such that the signified may illicitly become the signifier of
the sanctioned, and the ephemeral the reconstitution of the essential; places where ‘resistance is
performed’ (Brunner, p. 13).
Art education practice has already become a catalyst for rethinking research practices, teacher
education practice, and curriculum theory. Art educator Graeme Sullivan asserts that studio art
practices de-mask the spectrum of critical and creative forms of inquiry as an endeavor in
knowledge creation comparable to any other paradigm for doing research (Sullivan, 2005, 2006).
The Postmodern Educator: arts-based inquiries and teacher development (Diamond & Mullen, 1999)
is an example of a text where arts-based forms of inquiry are arrayed so as to de-mask that which is
concealed by ‘the more “rational” modes of inquiry and of teacher education’ so as to make the
formative experiences of teachers ‘more accessible, concrete, imaginable, and affecting’ (p. 20).
Sullivan (2006) also comments on the utility of certain practices common to art education when
adopted by ‘the perceptive educational practitioner’ (p. 24); he writes:
The role of lived experience, subjectivity, and memory are seen as agents in knowledge
construction and strategies such as self-study, collaborations, and textual critiques are used to
reveal important insights unable to be recovered by more traditional research methods.
(Sullivan, 2006, p. 24)

According to Curriculum and the Cultural Body (Springgay & Freedman, 2007), an understanding of
the human body ‘as meaning’ versus ‘a container in which we store or put meaning’ (p. xx) is
masked by the false mind/body dichotomy; this dichotomy is implicated in the goal of curriculum
mandates to assuage the impracticality of clumsy, growing bodies and unruly bodies of knowledge
by asserting the primacy of a rational and controlling mind. The authors present a book that
‘attends to the unspoken questions and practices in education that silence, conceal, and limit
bodies’ (Springgay & Freedman, 2007, p. xix). By conceptualizing various processes of cultural
production across several arts and visual culture mediums as a nexus of inquiry into the
constitution of ‘the lived body, the social body, and the imaginary’, Springgay & Freedman also
advocate an engaged pedagogical action that reconstructs embodied understandings of self,
experience and public life out in the open for all to see (2007, p. xix).
I will argue that by rethinking our conceptions of arts education practice, we reconceptualize
curriculum theory through an arts pedagogical model. I present a curriculum model which fosters
the agency to contradict bodies that have been made invisible through either the deficit-model of
childhood, the devaluation of embodied knowledge practices, or the historical rendering of
disability as social aberrance ... bodies all named, labeled, categorized, stereotyped or otherwise
caricatured in the regimes of popular discourse.
As pedagogical sites, the interstitial places represented by the back slashes and border
relationships in the printed term ‘in/di/visuality’ are indicative of the de-masking action of
performances or narratives of identity, or ‘identity statements’ (Brunner, 1998, p. 9). De-masking is,
in other words, the ‘social agency for the possibility of changing one’s material reality’ (Brunner,
1998, p. 9). The changing of material reality through performances of gestated identity is akin to
the performance of the Cinderella story that transformed pumpkins into coaches, rags into raiment,
and a designee of an almost untouchable caste into royalty.
Visuality and Masking in a Visual Culture
Visuality has alternatively been defined as ‘how we see, how we are able, allowed, or made to see,
and how we see this seeing and the unseeing therein’ (Foster, 1988, p. ix), and as the subjective
‘quality or state of being visual’ in an ‘everyday space [that] is increasingly dominated by visual
images’ (Sturken & Cartwright, 2001, p. 370). W.J.T. Mitchell recalls Nelson Goodman’s (1976)
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hypothesis that visual images are pictorial depictions of experience, replete with elements that
express their meanings only in relation to all the other elements ‘in a dense, continuous field’
(Mitchell, 1986, p. 67). The meaning is delivered in a single holistic visual conveyance, to be
unpackaged in mind in subsequent time. Similarly, Elliot Eisner (2002) has surmised that the
development of any given perception is the product of navigating and finding pathways back and
forth across a tensile structure of meanings staked to salient experiences. According to Eisner, the
visual arts practices offer a way to ‘help us become aware of ourselves’, our ideas and beliefs in a
most visceral manner and to more easily access, remake, reapply, and reinterpret those meanings in
relation to one another (2002, p. 112).
Goodman (1976) is also cited as explaining that text (or by extension, any text-analogue [1])
composed of a finite set of differentiated elements works by discontinuity. Each visual element,
each set of characters or events, is but a parcel of the larger conveyance of meaning. The
conveyance of meaning is, thus, episodic. There is time for unpacking between frames of insight,
making potential deviations of trajectory in the ‘reading’ an integral component of its induction.
The symbols, icons, and depictions that comprise our surrounding visuality may thus be
denotative, carrying a direct or literal translation of meaning, and/or connotative, non-literal and
loaded with collateral, implied, inferred, and subliminal meanings. In the episodic conveyance of
visuality, sometimes the episodes of meaning unfold into understanding in rapid succession, within
moments of the initial viewing, and sometimes they are spaced far apart in time, new meaning only
being added upon a return visit to the scene or presence. The key point is that the mind, ever in the
present, seeks to ameliorate discontinuities in perception by mapping over such episodes an overall
sense, or a story, that will package all the loose ends and dangling parts into something memorable
and familiar.
Elizabeth Cowie (2007) reminds us of Derrida’s notion that when something is represented,
there is always something left out of the account and that this discontinuity is central to the
meanings we derive. A representation thus ‘makes absent’ even as it makes present, and ‘makes
non-sense as it makes sense’ (Cowie, 2007, p. 101). The discontinuity in a representation leads to a
desirousness to retrieve lost reality and to fill in what has been left-out-of-the-account, resulting
both in readings which occur in spite of what has been left-out-of-the-account, and in misreadings
because of what has been left-out-of-the-account. The more left out, the greater the scope of
possible misreadings and the more likely the emergence of stereotyped understandings and
oversimplifications based on the preponderance of absences. Stereotypes hew closely to only the
most obvious saliencies such that what is left out becomes invisible, almost impossible to accept as
credible even when in plain sight. Invisibility wrought from the regulation of discontinuity and the
obfuscation of the markers of living and present identity is tantamount to the power to mask other
bodies from significance, ultimately devolving into acts of social caricature.
Art educator Kerry Freedman (2003) observes that ‘[v]isual culture images and objects are
continuously seen and instantaneously interpreted, forming new knowledge and new images of
identity and environment’ (p. 3). Visual culture – experienced ‘in classrooms, museum galleries,
community centers, people’s homes, on the street, and in movie theaters’ (Freedman, 2003, p. 2) –
includes ‘the fine arts, tribal arts, advertising, popular film and video, folk art, television and other
performance, housing and apparel design, computer game and toy design, and other forms of
visual production and communication’ (Freedman, 2003, p. 1).
In a polyglot visual culture that has gone global, the power to consistently caricature certain
others as insignificant is constituted by a network of visual regimes (Aching, 2002). Such regimes
may produce their caricatures willingly, as in the malicious stereotypes that first fester in the mind
of some Hitlerian puppet master before being unleashed as propaganda to the embrace of a bigoted
populace. Or, these regimes may produce their caricatures unthinkingly, simply potboiling en
masse the thin experience that a dominant and generally homogeneous sociocultural group has had
in interfacing with its local minorities.
Masking Practices as a Place of Capture
A squall of invisibility is set into motion through masking practices of the contemporary era,
swallowing up those who are identified as lesser physical bodies. The youngster or fledgling adult is
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viewed as ‘weak physically and spiritually’ and requiring rescue to a safe haven, a controlled and
well-cultivated children’s garden (i.e. kindergarten) to begin their upward climb to salvation (Baker,
2001, pp. 438, 514, 515). There is a conflation between the reality that infants, toddlers, young boys
and girls require custodial care for their physical well-being; the misconstrued idea that their
natural state is carelessness; and the bias that what our children care about and feel is less than
relevant to more significant adult concerns. This composite definition of ‘the child’ constitutes a
masking. In contemporary educational practice in the United States, youngsters are masked to such
a degree that K-12 curriculum is organized primarily to address the discursive construct of
‘childhood’, each youngster being perceived in need of ‘development’. Constrained from sight and
out of mind, the capability of little boys and girls to represent themselves as individual and
differentiated critical thinkers and collaborators in the curriculum-making process goes unseen.
Educators seek to protect these lesser bodies from what is perceived as ‘adult’ influence or
responsibility while expecting them to express little more than innocence and the desire for selfsatisfying play. Rendering the smallest bodies visible in educational practice requires un-naming the
signifiers of the psychohistorical narrative that presupposes ‘childhood’ as a model of evolutionary
deficit.
Masking practices of the contemporary era also rain invisibility on what are identified as lesser
bodies of knowledge, knowledge that is embodied, rational and explainable only in part, generated
in the exchange between ‘mind and body, self and other, and through our interactions with the
world’ (Irwin & Springgay, 2008, p. 108). Knowledge that is only partially explainable, even if it is
wholly recognizable, is entirely uncertain in an educational and research paradigm that privileges
the tests and verifications inherent in the sciences. Because of their tendency to resist quantifiable
measures and unambiguous representation, embodied ways of knowing are viewed as a
miscegenation of rational capability, a sordid admixture of foundational and objective knowledge
content with specific bodily awarenesses and processes that are decidedly anti-foundational and
more comfortably left unseen (Springgay, 2008). Educators seek to delimit lesser bodies of
knowledge from the curriculum, often segregating them to serve as outlets for self-expression and
exercises of self-esteem. Rendering embodied ways of knowing visible in educational practice
requires unmarking such practices from the taint of speciousness and invalidity in contemporary
education and research.
Those who are identified as possessing bodies lesser-than-normal are also swallowed up in an
occluding storm. In contemporary educational practice, those lacking the expected pigmentation,
physiognomy, testing scores, speech pattern, or gait are masked by K-12 public educational norms
into atypical discursive categories such as ‘minority’ or ‘special ed’ or ‘troubled’ or ‘inner city’ or
‘behaviorally challenged’, seeing each ‘difference’ in need of ‘mainstreaming’. Typically, educators
have sought the integration of these lesser-than-normal bodies into the normal classroom only after
they have been purified or redeemed to a semblance of normalcy through a remedial curriculum
pathway of in-school specialists and paraprofessionals aimed at rescuing the youngster from
congenital or hereditary abnormality. Historically, there has been a biomoral masking at work
here, ‘prompted through the medicalization of parts of society as unclean’ with common schooling
serving as a purifying contravention to the influx of ‘children of laboring/slave classes’ viewed as
‘the implicit carriers’ of ‘potential criminality’ (Baker, 2001, p. 434). The purpose of schooling in the
early campaigns to systematize common schools in America was defined as ‘saving children from
Hell and depravity’ and ‘saving American society from certain children’ (Baker, 2001, p. 434).
Rendering the bodies that discomfit us visible again requires a reinterpretation, contesting the
propaganda of social pathology, irredeemability, disability as aberrance, and less-than-normal skin,
bone, or hair.
I submit that art education, reconceived as transformative pedagogical practice, addresses the
representations that attach masks to bodies. Art education at the intersection of curriculum theory
may be understood as a practice that both informs and engenders the agency to reposition preexisting social regularities (Rolling, 2007a). I am theorizing in/di/visuality is a publicly held inquiry
into our own subjectivities, a transgressive reinterpretation of visual culture regimes and stigmas,
an unfolding of embodiments, those ways of knowing that cannot entirely ‘be conveyed through
language’ (Ellsworth, 2005, p. 156).
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To aid in understanding the term in/di/visuality more fully, the next sections of this research
will present brief narrative histories of the three kinds of invisibility addressed in this article as they
are manifested in educational practice and visual culture. A history takes shape as a story by sorting
disparate facts into a fitting relation. Davidson & Lytle (2000) write that ‘(h)istory is not “what
happened in the past”; rather, it is the act of selecting, analyzing, and writing about the past’ (p. xviii,
emphasis in original). In other words, the facts that populate our histories are meaningless in and of
themselves until one renders those facts significant by interpreting them. A more detailed
rendering of the term in/di/visuality will immediately follow these three histories, along with a
suggestion of the curricular implications within the term.
A Brief History of Lesser Bodies in Education
The conception of childhood that emerged from the Enlightenment purports a model of human
biological and social development that has been a key to Western interpretation of its own place in
the world. It has been argued that ‘[t]he developing child is not a real entity, but a discursive
construction, albeit a very powerful one’ (Walkerdine, 1993, p. 466). In his book Emile, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau ([1762] 1979) romanticized the innocence and dependence of a child and the child’s need
for an education presided over by an adult like himself – an adult capable of facilitating learning
experiences and providing resources to further childhood development. In doing so, Rousseau was
also elaborating on an Enlightenment ideal of staged and hierarchical biological and social
development.
However, the fact that children could be both similar to and absolutely different from one
another was perceived as a problem rather than a cause for celebration for those who sought an
ideal educational practice that could manufacture an ideal citizen and serve as a curative for the ills
of society. The desire for social ‘disease identification and remedy’ (Baker, 2001, p. 494) gave rise to
the many projects and pedagogical handbooks of the child study movement, ‘the first organized
movement to target public school reform in the United States and to deploy the terminology of
centering in or on the child’ (Baker, 2001, p. 428). By the 1900s, scientific beliefs about the
development of humans suggested that youngsters grew in stages similar to all other biological
organisms. The bodily markers of the young ‘were thought to be speakers of the quality of an
interior germ’ (Baker, 2001, p. 496); consequently, the psychological development of the young was
expected to be a recapitulation of what has come to be understood as an evolutionary model,
history ‘now attached to the visibility of the child’s body’ (Baker, 2001, p. 497).
Psychology had begun to make use of scientific methods of observation and aggregation of data
to investigate problems like [human will] in children, criminality in adults, delinquency in
juveniles, and degeneracy in races. It lay at the intersection of a variety of disciplines such as
anthropology, medicine, physiology, biology, and history and was not the only discipline
therefore to take up a strong belief in the idea that humans developed in recapitulating stages
that could be given pedagogical, moral, and intellectual significance. (Baker, 2001, p. 501)

In the aggregation of child-study data on a pupil, ‘(l)imb length, jaw angle, health, nationality, and
moral “virtues and perversions” could be recorded on the worksheets provided’ and pedagogical
inferences could thus be made about what ‘more could be done to help her or him develop’ (Baker,
2001, pp. 494, 495). In the study of ‘child development’, the young are understood to be lesser
bodies, bodies necessarily subject to the cultivation of adults if they are ever to become adults
themselves, but also bodies that, according to a philosophy of bodily markers, are the tacit
predictors of what kinds of adults they will grow up to be.
The construction of races was particularly dependent on a range of scientific activities heavily
reliant on physical classification ... The craniology, phrenology, and physiognomy that inhabited
Child-study handbooks and research in various forms assumed that the measurement of
attributes like head size, jaw angle, and limb length inferred human character and potential ... By
the turn of the new century, the techniques of internal measurements had moved inside the head
and gained popularity, in reference to intelligence testing especially. The inscription of [the
discourse of] science as evidence-gathering thereby acted to normalize opposition of races
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throughout the late 1800s, especially by referring to data that gave race what appeared within the
discursive matrix to be objective, material, and natural qualities. (Baker, 2001, pp. 496, 497)

As one of the early chroniclers of urban educational systems, John D. Philbrick (1885) is more frank
than most about the purpose of schooling as ‘the imposition of tasks; if the pupil likes it, well; if
not, the obligation is the same’ (p. 47). In David B. Tyack’s (1974) comprehensive history of
American urban education, he offers this snapshot of the late nineteenth-century classroom:
Through an elaborate system of gradation, programmed curriculum, examinations, and rules for
‘deportment,’ then, the pupil learned the meaning of obedience, regularity, and precision. He
learned to ‘toe the line’ – a phrase that today has lost its literal significance to most people.
Joseph Rice, who visited hundreds of urban classrooms in the 1890’s, described what it meant in
one school. During recitation periods, when students were to demonstrate that they had
memorized the text, children were expected, said Rice, ‘to stand on the line, perfectly
motionless, their bodies erect, their knees and feet together, the tips of their shoes touching the
edge of a board in the floor.’ The teacher paid as much attention to the state of their toes and
knees as to the words of their mouths: ‘How can you learn anything,’ asked one woman, ‘with
your knees and toes out of order?’ (pp. 55, 56)

English philosopher John Locke advanced the ‘concept of the child as a blank slate’, a concept of
childhood which ‘greatly influenced the development of public schools in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries’ (Spring, 2001, pp. 31, 32). Locke argued for having children learn through
rehearsed participation in classroom goals so that ‘[b]y repeating the same action, till it be grown
habitual in them, the performance will not depend on memory, or reflection, the concomitant of
prudence and age, and not of childhood; but will be natural in them’ (Locke, cited in Gay, 1964,
p. 36).
The modern exercise of schooling emerges as a form of social remediation seen in the
following observation, once again from Joseph Mayer Rice (1893), ‘a pediatrician who had studied
“educational science” in Germany’ (Tyack, 1974, p. 82):
In city after city, Rice witnessed similar episodes. In St. Louis the superintendent gave
examinations to test both students and teachers and observed classes like a military inspector to
see if the program was being followed. ‘The superintendent here reigns supreme; his rulings are
arbitrary; his word is law. But in exercising his license he deprives the child of his liberty ... the
years of childhood are converted into years of slavery’ ... Children were forced to sit with eyes
facing forward; even when they handed material to their neighbors, they stared ‘straight in front
of them’ and groped sideways to pass or receive papers. Pupils popped up and down like
automata when they recited definitions: ‘things appear as if the two children occupying adjoining
seats were sitting upon the opposite poles of an invisible see-saw, so that the descending child
necessarily raises the pupil next to him to his feet.’ Such recitations were just memorized ‘facts’
from the textbooks – after all, that was what the examinations tested. (Tyack, 1974, pp. 82, 83)

This legacy continues in the contemporary era of high-stakes testing, many teachers forced to hew
closely to the aforementioned nineteenth-century model of teaching-to-the-test because of the
threat of being held accountable to the No Child Left Behind Act signed into effect by President Bush
in 2002. In the attempt to assure predictable outcomes of learning, outcomes that are easy to
standardize, easy to test for, easy to measure, and easy to see the evidence of, modern educators
and educational policy succeed in making socially visible a bevy of normative narratives or
statements that together constitute the Western discourse of ‘the schooled child’ and its braided
tandem – the discourse of curriculum mandates for the best possible education for our children.
A Brief History of Lesser Bodies of Knowledge in Education
The scientific method for the observation, collection, and report of new knowledge has rules first
delineated by René Descartes in 1639 in The Discourse on Method, and further mapped in Isaac
Newton’s 1686 publication, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (or Newton’s Principia).
Descartes’ method sought solutions that were certain, requiring that the mind first be rid of all
preconceptions, and that the problem being observed then be reduced to mathematical form,
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employing ‘the minimum number of axioms, or self-evident propositions, to shape it’ (Van Doren,
1992, p. 204). Descartes invented analytic geometry to further reduce the problem’s description to a
set of numbers, applying the rules of algebra to arrive at a true result.
Newton enumerated four rules that would become the scientific method, rules that have
constituted a remarkably successful model for the creation of knowledge. The first is to admit no
superfluity of causes to natural things ‘than such as are both true and sufficient to explain the
appearances’. In other words, the simpler theory – the one less open to interpretation, less subject
to variances or nuances – is the better theory when given two competing theories making the same
predictions. The second is that the same natural effects, wherever they are observed in Nature, be
uniformly assigned the same causes. The third is that the qualities of phenomena or bodies
observed through experiment were universally applicable to phenomena and bodies everywhere.
And finally, all propositions inferred by the direct induction of empirical evidence shall be taken as
close to certainty, in spite of all other conjecture or hypotheses, until or unless some other
observable phenomenon occurs that might refine the accuracy of the proposition or define an
exception (Van Doren, 1992, pp. 209, 210).
The scientific method and its application to understanding the properties of natural objects
has been become the framework and the ceiling for understanding created things as well, since
material objects are always the derivatives of natural properties and must be subject to the physical
laws universally presumed to govern all things. Scientific methodology is thus taken as the model
for any manufacturing or object making, even the making of objets d’art. Scientific historian
Thomas S. Kuhn ([1962] 1996) coined the term ‘paradigm’ in defining the logical-mathematical
systems that model scientific thought. Jerome Bruner (1986) describes two dominant modes of
thought, the logical-mathematical systems that he describes as a ‘paradigmatic’ mode of thinking,
and a qualitative ecology he describes as a ‘narrative’ mode of thinking. Merlin Donald (1991) offers
this synopsis of Bruner’s position:
Narrative imagination constructs stories and historical accounts of events. Paradigmatic
imagination seeks logical truth. Narrative skill develops early and naturally in children, whereas
the logical-scientific skills that support paradigmatic thought emerge only after systematic
education. The difference between these modes of thought run very deep, even to the definition
of truth employed by each. In modern culture, the narrative mode still predominates in the arts,
while the paradigmatic predominates in the sciences. (p. 256-257)

Ronald N. Giere (1999) describes a polarizing conflict between what are commonly purported to be
the only two possible camps of cognitive affiliation: those who are scientists and seek foremost a
universally applicable and deductive knowledge of the world that removes all messy uncertainties,
constructing extensions to elevated pathways raised above the mire; and those who are humanists
and who seek a collective self-knowledge willing to slog through the muddy ambiguities which are
common to the human experience, painstakingly tramping paths where, initially, there are none.
Both of these camps employ empirical strategies based on the processing of observed phenomena
as evidence of unconsidered possibilities. Moreover, both of these camps are geared toward
exploration: While those whose methodology is scientific seek the above-the-fray efficiency and
quantitative progression that objectivity is purported to allow, those whose methodology is
unsparingly human and subjective are willing to wander off-course more often than not and afford
themselves the encounter of unpredicted qualities of experience – the surprise of unexpected fields
of play.
On the one side, we find what I would call ‘enlightenment rationalists’ or ‘metaphysical realists,’
who are, however, often derisively referred to as ‘reductionists’ or ‘essentialists.’ This camp
includes most scientists ... The other camp contains mostly intellectuals, some historians and
philosophers of science, many sociologists of science, and many students of literature and culture
generally. To their enemies, these students of culture ... are merely ‘relativists’ or
‘postmodernists.’ (Giere, 1999, p. 1)

Newman & Benz argue that this dichotomy is ‘based upon the differences in assumptions about
what reality is and whether or not it is measurable’ and extends into a debate regarding the means
by which humans seek to create new knowledge, ‘whether through objective or subjective
methods’ (Newman & Benz, 1998, p. 2).
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Gross & Levitt (1998), in their invective against lesser bodies of knowledge in education
throughout their book Higher Superstition [2], make crystal clear characterizations of the measured
constructs of real science as ‘reliable factual knowledge’ (p. 12), ‘objective truth about the world’
(p. 52), ‘exacting logical analysis of abstract models’ (p. 62), ‘driven by the unyielding contours of
reality’ (p. 81), ‘hard-won truth’ (p. 85), ‘rationality itself’ (p. 165). Conversely, Gross & Levitt
characterize that which is other than science as ‘muddleheadedness’ (p. 1), ‘insularity and
ignorance’ (p. 7), ‘symbolic wish-fulfillment’ (p. 8), ‘weakness of fact and logic’ (p. 8), ‘unprovable
and bootless speculation’ (p. 12), ‘trendy doctrine, windy generalization’ (p. 37), ‘tooth-fairy
hypothesis’ (p. 47), ‘incoherent’ (p. 51), ‘hallucinatory’ (p. 52), ‘hermeneutic hootchy-koo’ (p. 53),
‘untrammeled relativism’ (p. 84), ‘philosophical styrofoam’ (p. 98), ‘intellectual tinsel’ (p. 100),
‘febrile delusion’ (p. 103), ‘metaphors’ (p. 112), ‘academic inner city’ (p. 136), ‘moonbeams and
fairydust’ (p. 176), ‘unsupported by any evidence’ (p. 211), and ‘pathetic gullibility’ (p. 212).
The allusions reached as a consequence of such vitriol are quickly arrived at: while scientific
rationalists are busy engineering cities in the sky, artists and other like-minded humanists are
wasting their time hunting and gathering the intangibles of the human experience. Those less than
scientific are doomed to remain the denizens of lesser domains, of lesser bodies of knowledge. The
general perception is that scientific knowledge supersedes all else in modern cognition, causing all
other ways of knowing to disappear into a mandated obsolescence, regarding the arts as an
example ‘as nice but not necessary’ (Eisner, 2002, p. xi).
What knowledge is of the most worth? – the uniform reply is – Science. This is the verdict on all
the counts. For direct self-preservation, or the maintenance of life and health, the all-important
knowledge is – Science. For that indirect self-preservation which we call gaining a livelihood, the
knowledge of greatest value is – Science. For the due discharge of parental functions, the proper
guidance is to be found only in – Science. For that interpretation of national life, past and
present, without which the citizen cannot rightly regulate his conduct, the indispensable key is –
Science. Alike for the most perfect production and highest enjoyment of art in all its forms, the
needful preparation is still – Science. And for the purposes of discipline – intellectual, moral,
religious – the most efficient study is, once more – Science. (Spencer, 1896, pp. 93, 94)

Today, good scientific practices and better science education in schools continue to be trumpeted
as what are needed most in the world, a panacea for improving all things, systemizing and
collapsing the observable world into measurable, controllable, predictable bits, creating a world
that can be safely known. Since scientific methodologies are primarily mathematical (Van Doren,
1992) rather than metaphorical, it is not surprising that a world that can be safely known is also
ostensibly a world that can be safely measured, statistically tested, and reproduced in artificially
simulated conditions. In spite of art educator Elliot Eisner’s (2002) admonition that ‘science is a
species of research; research is not a species of science’ (p. 209), scientific knowledge domains are
purported to be higher bodies of knowledge, pure and certain because these bodies hold no claim
to be valid beyond the empirically tested boundaries. That which cannot be scientifically
researched is considered speculation at best, and certainly not reliable as knowledge as it is unlikely
to exist as we might like to believe it does and until we prove beyond a doubt that it does.
A Brief History of Lesser-Than-Normal Bodies in Education
In the context of human social interaction, normalcy is constructed systematically, organized as
social regularities that problematize those who do not measure up to, or who flout conformity
with those exemplars constructed as normal. As Thomson (1997) puts it, ‘the physically
extraordinary figure’ such as ‘the cripple, the invalid, and the freak’ is very much ‘as essential to the
cultural project of American self-making as the varied throng of gendered, racial, ethnic, and social
figures of otherness that support the privileged norm’ (p. 5). In Western scientific discourse, one
invariably encounters medians, averages, likelihoods, and patterns constructed as binary axes,
polarities of understanding, as normal distributions, and standard deviations. The concept of
establishing norms has a statistical derivation advanced amongst Western industrialists during the
early 1800s. Adolphe Quetelet elaborated a conception of the ‘average man’ that saw ‘the
bourgeoisie as rationally placed in the mean position in the great order of things (Davis, 1995,
p. 27). Quetelet himself wrote that ‘an individual who epitomized in himself, at a given time, all the
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qualities of the average man, would represent at once all the greatness, beauty and goodness of that
being’ (cited in Porter, 1986, p. 102).
Within the dispensation of a rule of averages, it is implied ‘that the majority of the population
must or should somehow be part of the norm’ (Davis, 1995, p. 29). In a society where the concept
of ‘able-bodiedness’ as a norm is in operation, normalcy is further entrenched if every deviating or
limited body is problematized as a societal defect and marginalized as a ‘repository for social
anxieties’ (Thomson, 1997, p. 6). Public opinion and common sense can, however, become a
eugenicist ‘tyranny’ of normalcy when averages are corporealized and differences are measured
either as preordained deviations from the desirable, or as a tragically acquired disability that
cripples conformity to agreed constructs of beauty and well-being. Disability studies scholar
Lennard J. Davis (1995) writes:
We live in a world of norms. Each of us endeavors to be normal or else deliberately tries to avoid
that state. We consider what the average person does, thinks, earns, or consumes. We rank our
intelligence, our cholesterol level, our weight, sex drive, bodily dimensions along some
conceptual line from subnormal to above-average. We consume a minimum daily balance of
vitamins and nutrients based on what an average human should consume. Our children are
ranked in school and tested to determine where they fit into a normal curve of learning, of
intelligence. Doctors measure and weigh them to see if they are above or below average on the
height or weight curves. There is probably no area of contemporary life in which some idea of a
norm, mean, or average has not been calculated. (p. 23)

The propaganda of normalcy, and correlating acts and declarations of stigmatization, fixes the
desirability of normalcy in the public opinion by systematically stigmatizing alternative behaviors
and appearances. Because behavior patterns are fair predictors of future behaviors, the
manipulation of public attitudes – such as legislated penalties for nonconformity to norms, public
schooling utilizing normalizing and stigmatizing textbook narratives, the media advertisement of
desirable behavior and appearances and social rewards for adherence to those models, and the
segregation of deviants and undesirables into marginalized social arenas, communities, and
vocational tracks – has served as a masking strategy leaving the spotlight only on the norms
Western societies continue to hold central. Ashis Nandy (1983) defines the West as being ‘a world
view which believes in the absolute superiority of the human over the nonhuman, the masculine
over the feminine, the adult over the child, the historical over the ahistorical, and the modern or
progressive over the traditional or the savage’ (p. x).
What makes possible the emergence of the normal and the invisibility of those who deviate
from publicly accepted norms of beauty, speech, and lifestyle? Paradoxically, the representation of
the disabled figure in culture and literature in lesser-than-normal masks ‘simultaneously buttresses
an embodied version of normative identity and shapes a narrative of corporeal difference that
excludes those whose bodies or behaviors do not conform’ (Thomson, 1997, p. 7). It is a useful
fiction that some are normal citizens of the state, and others marked as exemplars of a tragic failing,
still yet to emerge from savagery and the natural, pre-lingual, irrational, amoral and primitive state
imagined so vividly in the seminal texts of Enlightenment mythology (Davis, 1995, p. 55).
When the body itself is marked with the socially inflicted stigma of invalidity as a citizen, of
illegitimacy as a contributor to history or normal ways of knowing, and as an identity invisible and
irrelevant to the public gaze, the body itself is transformed by the normalizing/stigmatizing
language game into something akin to a corporealized fingerprint. The discourse of stigma is
interpreted as nothing less than ‘real’ in the court of public opinion, where the language game plays
out.
Thus the body has an identity that coincides with its essence and cannot be altered by moral,
artistic, or human will. This indelibility of corporeal identity only furthers the mark placed on the
body by other physical qualities – intelligence, height, reaction time. By this logic, the person
enters in an identical relationship with the body, the body forms the identity, and the identity is
unchangeable and indelible as one’s place on the normal curve ... this fingerprinting of the body
means that the marks of physical difference become synonymous with the identity of the person.
(Davis, 1995, pp. 31, 32)
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Norms tell stories both of favor and desire; deviations from the norm are always predicated upon
those stories. Western society strives to make beliefs of what it sees or thinks it sees with its own
eyes, and ideates the preponderance of its constituents as representing the core of those beliefs and
ideologies. Any given norm will always be the majority of instances falling within a particular ‘bell
curve’ of empirical sightings. Hence, the majority population rules the center of the roost, and its
point of view establishes accepted boundaries of significance and normalcy and the power to confer
stigmatization or ‘abnormalcy’ upon those who do not compare favorably to those in the center,
upon those who occupy positions that fall beyond established boundaries.
A common assumption would be that some concept of the norm must have always existed. After
all, people seem to have an inherent desire to compare themselves to others. But the idea of a
norm is less a condition of human nature than it is a feature of a certain kind of society ... the
social process of [invalidating] arrived with industrialization and with a set of practices and
discourses that are linked to late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century notions of nationality, race,
gender, criminality, sexual orientation, and [any other area of apparent incapacity or
shortcoming]. (Davis, 1995, p. 24)

The establishment of intractable norms soothes the anxiety of indeterminability and insolubility.
Norms are safe – however, they also make a democratic society nearly impossible. The security of
the bell curve is not new to the mindset of public policy makers. In 1908, when Charles W. Eliot –
near the conclusion of his term as president of Harvard University – was questioned as to how the
decision might be made that certain children go to industrial schools, others to ordinary high
schools, and others to mechanics art high schools, Eliot’s response was that ‘[t]he teachers of the
elementary schools ought to sort the pupils and sort them by their evident and probable destinies’
(cited in Kliebard, 1999, p. 43).
How does an educator or public policy maker presume a destiny? What evidence is plainly
evident enough, wholly certain enough to declaim certain probability in the chaos of human
existence? Such prognostications can only be based upon previously agreed norms and the position
of the boundary markers of a society’s borders of ‘statistical significance’. Who counts more? Who
counts less? Who is utterly invisible? Nearly a hundred years after Eliot’s departure from Harvard’s
halls, determinations of the probable values and quality of students’ lives still prevail because of the
norms held in common. ‘Normalcy’ or ‘normality’ is a discursive contraption that attempts to
permanently ensconce the unfortunate denizens of the unacceptable ranges of modern society in
an oppositional system that ‘preserve(s) the irrational status quo’ (Schafer, 1981, p. 41).
Europeans showed impartiality in their belief in the monsters beyond the bell curve of
Western normality. They equated the gods of the Indian religions with the devil (Taussig, 1986).
Europeans also categorized Africans as heathen, and their folklore and religions as the spawn of
devil (Genovese, 1974, pp. 159-284). The powers of the Indian shaman to cure or to kill, African
idolatry, and the European belief in magic and witchcraft all blended into a fear of the
uncontrollable as a power that must either vanquish or be vanquished (Lea, 1908, p. 462). Finding
one of his party, ailing in the grip of the forest climate yet searching for a shaman rather than the
expedition’s pharmacy, Father Gaspar de Pinell remarked that ‘it is more likely that the civilized
man will become a savage on mixing with the Indians than the Indians are likely to be civilized
through the actions of the civilized’ (cited in Taussig, 1986, p. 81).
The idea that anomaly is ‘synonymous with danger and evil’ is also characterized in Western
literature and film in the ‘symbolic uses of disability’ (Thomson, 1997, p. 36).
That ubiquitous icon of physical anomaly, the monster, exemplifies culture’s preoccupation with
the threat of the different body. Disabilities do not simply mark evil, but function as menace in
such prototypical villains as Shakespeare’s Richard III, Dickens’s Quilp, Melville’s Ahab, Poe’s
Hop Frog, and Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove. Like the monsters who are their fantastic
cousins, disabled characters with power virtually always represent a dangerous force unleashed
on the social order. (Thomson, 1997, p. 36)

In The White Man’s Burden, Rudyard Kipling ([1899] 1998) describes the lesser-than-normal bodies
subject to colonialism as ‘new-caught, sullen peoples, half-devil and half-child’, racially depicting a
daunting confluence of congenital physical, spiritual, and intellectual flaws and deviances surely
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dooming all non-Europeans to live in poverty and ignorance were it not for the beneficence of the
ruling empire (p. 57).
In America, the Western narrative of manifest destiny – a mandate to conquer the fearsome,
the sinful, and the ugly, and to subjugate monsters in all worlds, lost, old and new – became a
masking practice that is visible at the very beginning of the American saga. Native North and South
Americans were declared to be savages, unfit to retain dominion over their own land. In the
Constitution, slaves were declared to be domesticated chattel, equal in measure to three-fifths of a
man, at best.
Believing that Anglo-American culture [was superior] ... and the only culture that would support
republican and democratic institutions, educators forbade the speaking of non-English languages,
particularly Spanish and Native American tongues, and forced students to learn an AngloAmerican-centered curriculum ... Conquered Indians were exposed to educational programs that
emphasized patriotism and loyalty to the U.S. government. As tribal governments fell, Indian
schools raised the U.S. flag and forced students to pledge their loyalty to the conquering nation ...
federal and state officials attempted to gain emulation by using textbooks that reflected the
dominant white culture of the United States and that contained no reference to Hispanic or
Indian cultures. (Spring, 2001, p. 169)

Operating within the currency of what Lennard J. Davis (1995) has termed the ‘hegemony of the
normal’, the history of the United States government is replete with instances wherein the
proximity of subaltern bodies was meliorated by schooling and/or institutionalization as the initial
and/or primary means for the corrective address (Tyack, 1974; Levine, 1996; Spring, 2001).
Historically, disabled people have for the most part been segregated either as individuals or in
groups. Much of Michel Foucault’s analysis of the modern subject reveals the way marginalized
individuals – such as disabled people – have been enclosed, excluded, and regulated. Societies
encode their collective prejudices in segregation legislation, such as the common U.S. ‘ugly laws’
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that banned visibly disabled people from appearing in
public places. Similarly, asylums and almshouses that flourished in nineteenth-century America
provided custodial segregation as limited aid to disabled people ... Today, disabled people,
especially women, tend to be ghettoized by poverty and lack of education, those stigmatic
situations that so frequently coincide with and reinforce marginalization based on physical traits.
(Thomson, 1997, p. 35)

Today, bodies that are deaf or blind or diseased or lame or are identified as too dark or too bent or
too slow or too broken continue be treated as if the cast of their shadow across the cut-out of the
average body was still anathema to the normalized soul.
Outlining the Contours of In/di/visuality
The term in/di/visuality is a way of illuminating a site of gestation in identity formation already at
work in those who occupy a visual culture; it may be constructed both as a noun and as the verb to
in/di/visualize, as a designation both of social work sites and of transformative social practice.
Contemporary public schooling practice in the United States focused on the generation of
standards-based evidence of learning, is oriented to overlook the gestation of new identity and
selfhood within the seams in between the three kinds of invisibility. Individuality and visuality are
opposing forces, the former being a discrete meaning-making tool, the latter being a network of
socially situated sites of perceptual gestation.
Educators are not mandated to initiate or engineer the cultural work of in/di/visuality;
educators are challenged to recognize in/di/visuality at work and allow it space in the curriculum.
The student does the hard part. The initiation and operation of the in/di/visuality brings the
individuality and visuality which are already native to each of our students into a dialectical
relationship. In/di/visuality is a publicly-held inquiry into the power to mask and/or reinterpret
significance, with the self as the tool of the research acting within a nexus of sites of contention. In
this public forum, in/di/visuality enables a transgressive reinterpretation of the visual culture
regimes that affect the individual both directly and indirectly; in/di/visuality is a form of agency
within one’s subjectivity as a visually typecast representative of stigma.
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As a suffix in the nexus of in/di/visuality, the vast and globalized traffic of visuality is tapped,
localized, and drawn into rapprochement with one’s own individuality. In an instructional context,
art educator Brent Wilson (2005) describes this site of action as the first pedagogical site, ‘the vast
“territory” containing many informal spaces outside of and beyond classrooms where kids ... both
construct their own visual cultural texts and consume the visual cultural texts made by others
(p. 18). It is important to consider that long before professional educators come into contact with
students, the visual culture has already had a profound influence on the content and shape of
youngsters’ ideas.
In the central action in the nexus of in/di/visuality, narratives of individuality and narratives
of visuality reorganize one another. Self-concepts and sociocultural ideas become dialectical and
recombinant mediums, like chemical dioxides, acting together catalytically although constituted
initially as opposing forces. Individuality is wielded as a discretionary tool that works to
intussuscept sociocultural ideas, interpreting and embodying them visibly in a new site of action,
the individual identity. The dialectic between individuality and visuality becomes a portal for
‘carnivalesque’ slippages, the profanation of the ‘proper’ borders between the socially sanctioned or
popular, and the individually reconstituted or performed (Bakhtin, cited in Brunner, 1998, p. 49).
Walter Truett Anderson (1997) states that ‘your worldview and your self-concept are always
connected, and when one changes so does the other’ (p. 11). Conversely, visuality impresses itself
upon identities with shaping stories, sociocultural depictions of reality in the news media,
entertainment, viral video, advertisements and works of visual art that shape idiosyncratic views of
the world. The conversation between individual imagination and various sociocultural depictions
may be initiated in what Wilson (2005) describes as the second pedagogical site, the ‘conventional
art classrooms in schools (or museums and community art classrooms) where teachers direct
student artmaking’ (p. 18).
As a prefix in the nexus of in/di/visuality, individuality disturbs and reveals the unseen
archaeologies of visuality, bringing compounded layers of visual cultural influences to the forefront
of one’s attention. Wilson’s ‘third pedagogical site’ is theorized as ‘a site where adults and kids
collaborate in making connections and interpreting webs of relationships ... among the images that
kids make for themselves and the images that adults ask them to make’ (2005, p. 18). Wilson’s third
pedagogical site resists the deficit-model of childhood as a mask of concealment and de-cloaks a
narrative of identity that privileges the agency of the youngster.
Narrative inquiry, then, is a strategy for resistance. When inquiry and reflection show the ways
identities shift and overlap as they resist boundaries of cultural containment, then as a strategy it
may help to map or structure sites necessary for rearticulating identity and difference. (Brunner,
1998, p. 52)

Wilson’s third pedagogical site is crisscrossed, then, with collaborative and narrative inquiries
which navigate
the multiformational power arrangement that is manifested in the visual culture, a navigation
that functions to reposition dominant group image-making and the images of non-dominant
subgroupings, repositioning the preeminence and position of image-making exemplars in the
constitution of the national and individual identities, repositioning meaning and identity within
the larger Western visual and popular culture. (Rolling, 2007a, pp. 15, 16)

In/di/visuality, born of reinterpreted autobiography and social narratives, thus becomes ‘a strategy
for resistance’ (Brunner, 1998, p. 52).
Sites of In/di/visuality in Education
The play of in/di/visuality is relevant as a curricular concern because it is simultaneously a way of
knowing the world and learning to navigate a way through it; a methodology for depicting and
communicating new understandings as they are created; a parlance for reinterpreting the powers
that constrain us even as we are subject to those constraints.
Operating pedagogically from sites of social contention, an understanding of methods for
supporting student in/di/visuality has curricular implications that place acts of art-making in the
center of every curriculum endeavor. Walter Truett Anderson (1997) claims that ‘personal
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identities would be hard to locate without the network of symbols within which we are defined
and the internal monologue with which we continually remind ourselves who we think we are’
(p. 263). Psychologist Howard Gardner points out that a transgressing story ‘must compete with
many other extant stories; and if the new stories are to succeed, they must transplant, suppress,
complement, or in some measure outweigh the earlier stories, as well as contemporary
oppositional “counterstories”’ (Gardner, 1995, p. 14). In the visual culture’s theater of multiple
selves and simultaneous stories, galleries of reinscribed images become sites for newly inaugurated
complexities, for freshly enunciated matrices of identity and self-imagery.
A ‘mental image’ of self is akin to the narrative of personal memory, images of the self held in
mind that have been impressed on us by the experience of our selves as reflected back to us in our
passage through the world (Mitchell, 1986, p. 22). Revisited self-imaging in visual culture may be
taken, then, as an agent of visibility and social change. Repositioning self-images allows a body of
knowledge initially outside the scope of our discourse of identity to be incorporable into our
familiar archaeologies. Repositioning is born of slippages and displacements. Diane Dubose
Brunner (1998) describes the importance of displacement as a practice in the prevention of the
‘creation of new orthodoxy’ (p. 58). However, in/di/visuality goes beyond resistance to the active
generation of new anomalies of identity and amalgamations of significance. What do educational
projects look like when they allow the invisible to become visible?
My job is first to open up curricular spaces where students can picture themselves in the
world, no matter whether that picture is pretty or not, locating personal significance along with the
agency to reinterpret the signifiers they have thus far embodied; secondly, my job is to open up a
space where students can picture a more just and refined world, critiquing the cultural stories we
hold to be socially significant or insignificant and exercising their acquired agency to make changes
along the way; thirdly, my job is to open up a space where students can practice and expand upon a
repertoire of marks and movements that will make visible the self-imagery and stories that they
have rendered to be personally and socially significant, capturing the attention of others so that
they too may see a possibility previously overlooked or unseen. It is important to re-emphasize that
I have been theorizing in/di/visuality as an amalgam of art education, visual culture and
curriculum practice that does not rely on the opening of new spaces since slippages and
displacement is inherent in practice that opens up access to the ‘sites of contention’ in between
known masks (Rolling, 2008).
In keeping with my job as an educator to open up curricular spaces where students can
picture themselves in the world, locating self-image along with the agency to reinterpret the
signifiers they have embodied, I have afforded first graders the opportunity to pictorialize some of
the rudimentary concepts that were just becoming meaningful to them. In one such class I asked
the students the question, ‘What is big?’ One child responded, ‘A dinosaur skull is big’. He was then
given the simple tools to visually recount the recent museum visit he was remembering in the
context of a color pencil drawing. This drawing became a self-portrait as the boy drew himself
standing in a large cap next to his dad, the tallest figure in the drawing, as they both viewed the
dinosaur skull along with a few other museum visitors. The student’s concept of what ‘big’ is was
tied to his rendering of an experiential, visual/spatial encounter in relation to his own body
(Rolling, 2006). The curricular narrative here is: As I stand in the midst of all that we choose to look
upon, who am I?
In keeping with my job as an educator to open up curricular spaces where students can
picture a more just and refined world, I facilitated a political cartooning exercise for fourth graders
in the wake of the 2004 presidential election (Rolling, 2008). I began by asking students to name
and pictorialize an injustice in the world today that he or she wanted to help make better. I
explained a political cartoon to be a commentary on current events that expresses an opinion and
serves to persuade others by its appearance in the public conversation. I further explained that
political cartoons are drawings representing current public figures or important social issues
symbolically and often satirically, and that art was very much about the ideas my students thought
were important. This exercise culminated by posting our opinions in an open gallery on the World
Wide Web through our school’s website. One student poignantly rendered a hapless Iraqi civilian
in the midst of explosions from a United States military assault, apartment buildings and cars ablaze
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in the background, with a caption reading, ‘Here we go again: the terrorist bombing’. The
curricular narrative here is: Observing that which we typically leave unseen, who are we?
In a third instance and in keeping with my job as an educator to open up curricular spaces
where students can practice and expand upon a repertoire of marks, movements, and modelings
that will make visible the self-imagery and stories they have rendered to be personally and socially
significant, I sponsored the ‘Who I Am’ storytelling project for a small group of third and fourth
graders in my final year as a full-time elementary school teacher. In this project, personal family
artifacts, heirlooms and family stories were to serve as the inspiration for art making, historical
research, and the development and performance of self-image and family identity. One student
drew upon a jar of sand physically carried from the beaches of Barbados when her greatgrandmother immigrated to these North American shores; in homage, the student created a threedimensional timeline of clay figurines, each representing the maternal figures in her family, each
passing the jar down to their daughters, each miniature jar holding grains of sand from the original
jar (Rolling, 2007b). The curricular narrative here is: What understandings are yielded in the second
and third look at what has already been seen?
The aforementioned exercises in in/di/visuality all took place in sites of art education,
typically an off-site point of reference (Rolling, 2006) for most curriculum theorizing. In the
narrative of these instances we see an art education practice less interested in self-expression and
learned techniques than in critical self-refinement as one is seen by the world, communityrefinement as one sees and critically engages the world, and sight-refinement as one critically
navigates the contending meanings and ideas in a world steeped in visuality. Summarily, my
argument is that a reconceptualization of art education also reconceptualizes curriculum on all sites
of contemporary educational practice, practices beset on all sides and sodden through and through
by the swells and surges of a visual culture.
Our students – though disabled, though darker-skinned, though differently-minded – may
become visible even in a perfect storm of occluding imagery, positioning their bodies and ideas to
withstand each successive squall, displacing the torrents of three kinds of invisibility like watersheds
in a tempest. Reinterpretive masks or masks of agency are at first just as invisible as those
previously rendered invisible; it is not easy to see at first that that which was invisible has been
utterly reinscribed. The Cinderella standing here before us cannot possibly be the same person who
was heretofore unseen. We may have just missed ‘the masquerade ... which makes possible the
rearticulation of identity’ (Butler, 1993, p. 241).
Notes
[1] In his writing on the act of interpretation Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1976) suggests that
there are multiple phenomena that, although not text, are analogous to text in that we treat them as
the objects of our interpretation. He writes: ‘Interpretation, in the sense relevant to hermeneutics, is
an attempt to make clear, to make sense of an object of study. This object must, therefore, be a text,
or a text-analogue, which in some way is confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly contradictory – in
one way or another, unclear. The interpretation aims to bring to light an underlying coherence or
sense’ (p. 153).
[2] The catalogue of salient phrases in Gross & Levitt’s text was compiled by Thomas F. Gieryn (1999). A
more extended version is found on pages 354 and 355 of Gieryn’s book, Cultural Boundaries of Science.
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